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Abstract 
The aim of the paper is to propose a way in which believing on trust 
can ground doxastic justification and knowledge. My focus will be 
the notion of trust that plays the role depicted by such cases as 
concerned John Hardwig in his early papers (Hardwig 1985; 
Hardwig 1991), papers that are often referenced in recent debates in 
social epistemology. My primary aim is not exegetical, but since it 
sometimes not so clear what Hardwig's claims are, I offer some 
remarks of interpretation that might be of interest. The main purpose 
of the paper, however, is this: following various cues in Hardwig's 
writing, I specify certain epistemic properties of agents in social 
systems, such that, roughly speaking, for agents to know (or be 
justified in believing) what the 'system knows', social relations of 
epistemic trust between agents in the system are necessary. I will 
                                                
#  Research on this paper has been generously funded by the 
Velux Foundation. Earlier versions of this material was presented at 
a departmental seminar, a SERG Workshop on epistemic trust, 
December 2010, the 3rd Copenhagen Conference in Epistemology, 
August 15-17 2011, and 2nd Berlin Conference on Meta-
Epistemology, September 1-3 2011. I thank participants at these 
events for patience and helpful comments [in alphabetical order]: 
Kristoffer Ahlström, Finn Collin, Paul Faulkner, Axel Gelfert, Mikkel 
Gerken, Sandy Goldberg, Kathrine Hawley, Chris Kelp, Arnon 
Keren, Jennifer Lackey, Brent Madison, Kirk Michelian, Martin 
Kusch, Duncan Pritchard, Gloria Orrigi, Ernest Sosa, Nikolaj Jang 
Lee Linding Pedersen, Shane Ryan, Sebastian Rödl, Chris Thompson, 
Michael Williams, Frank Zenker. 
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suggest that we can view this social form of epistemic trust as non-
inferential dispositions to believe what some individual or other 
source of information asserts or transmits. When this disposition is 
discriminating and defeater-sensitive, it can ground knowledge and 
justification. Or, more cautiously, we should be sympathetic to this 
view if we are inclined to accept the core insight of process 
reliabilism. Finally, I will offer some remarks about how epistemic 
trust and epistemic reasons may relate on this picture.  
 
1. Believing on trust 
The concern in the following is believing on trust, that is, believing a 
proposition because one trusts some person, institution or indeed 
tradition conveying it. The aim of the paper is to propose a way in 
which believing on trust can ground epistemic justification and 
knowledge. The main examples I will be concerned about are those 
provided by Hardwig, where he claims that beliefs accepted upon 
trust among members of the scientific community is essentially 
involved in much of what we normally regard as scientific 
knowledge (Hardwig 1985; Hardwig 1991).  
 I will assume that in cases like these we accept certain beliefs 
as true, or likely to be true, because we trust a human or institutional 
source asserting the proposition in question. So in a sense, trust is 
our reason for accepting the belief. And we often express this by 
saying things like: 'I believe that p because my friend told me, and I 
trust my friend on these matters'. Often, of course, trust in a source 
will only be one part of the full explanation of why one adopts a 
particular belief. So, it might typically be more accurate if also more 
cumbersome to say that we accept a belief in part because we trust 
some source. 
 I will use the label 'epistemic trust' when I talk about trust 
involved in these and similar cases where we adopt beliefs on the 
basis of trust. The overall aim of the paper is to outline a theory of 
epistemic trust. More specifically, I want to propose a process 
reliabilist account of how we can acquire knowledge and justified 
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belief on grounds of epistemic trust. As we will see, the project bears 
many similarities to the programme of (Goldberg 2010), from which I 
have learned a lot. There are other prominent uses of the word 'trust', 
or 'rational trust', and I will comment briefly on some below, but my 
main concern is not to discuss these. 
 It is natural for philosophy to ask what epistemic trust is. 
What is the nature of the attitude or the relation? Does epistemic 
trust in A, for example, reduce to having certain beliefs about A? If so, 
epistemic trust would be a doxastic attitude, and accepting beliefs on 
grounds of trust would be a special case of something quite familiar 
in epistemology. One alternative to this picture would be to view 
epistemic trust as distinct kind of non-doxastic attitude, say 
something like a feeling of confidence or an emotion. If this is how 
we think of epistemic trust, then it seems that any significant 
epistemic role of trust would require some explanation. Below, I 
shall propose that we view epistemic trust as neither a doxastic 
attitude, nor as a non-doxastic psychological attitude. We can, I want 
to suggest, view epistemic trust as a dispositional property. 
 Another interesting question concerns whether or how 
epistemic trust can ground knowledge and justification? Can 
epistemic trust have reasons? Can epistemic trust without reasons be 
rational? Can epistemic trust interact with reasons and evidence, and 
if so how?  
 Before trying to address such questions, we should, I believe, 
note an important caveat. Generally, we should not presuppose that 
trust is a distinct uniform type of psychological attitude or 
interpersonal relation. The word 'trust' in ordinary parlance does not 
denote a unified mental or social kind, or at least we cannot take this 
for granted at the outset of our philosophical theorising. Rather, 
there seems to be a fairly heterogeneous family of related 
phenomena that may be variously picked out when we talk about 
trust, or this is what I suspect at any rate. Something similar holds, of 
course, of the label 'epistemic trust' except that this phrase is not 
even part of ordinary parlance. It is a term of art that does not have 
any interesting meaning apart from the one we invest in it. In 
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consequence, different accounts of trust in the philosophical 
literature may very likely conceptualize different phenomena going 
under the same name. 
 In view of this fact, my strategy will be the following. Though 
my aim is not exegetical, I will focus on the kind of trust that figures 
in John Hardwig's well-known papers (Hardwig 1985; Hardwig 
1991). Hardwig argued that the sort of pervasive division of 
cognitive labour now prevalent in the sciences requires extensive 
believing on trust (more on this below). My focus will be the notion 
of trust that plays the role depicted by such cases as concern 
Hardwig. There are, to be sure, other notions of epistemic trust in the 
litterature, but I shall have little to say about them. 
 Thus, I will proceed as follows. Following various cues in 
Hardwig's papers, I specify certain epistemic properties of agents in 
social systems, such that, roughly speaking, for agents to know (or be 
justified in believing) what the 'system knows', relations of epistemic 
trust between agents in the system are necessary. So what I propose 
is, in a sense, a functional account of epistemic trust, as distinct from 
for example a genealogical account of epistemic trust (Faulkner 2007; 
Kappel 2010). I will suggest that we can view epistemic trust as non-
inferential disposition to believe what some individual or other 
source of information asserts or transmits. When this disposition is 
discriminating and defeater-sensitive, it can ground knowledge and 
justification. Thirdly, I will explain how, given standard process 
reliabilism, beliefs adopted on this basis trust can indeed qualify as 
known and justified belief. Finally, I will offer some remarks about 
how epistemic trust and epistemic reasons may relate on this picture.  
2. Trust as socio-epistemic glue 
In his well known papers on trust and knowledge (Hardwig 1985; 
Hardwig 1991), Hardwig observed that scientific research commonly 
is the product of collaboration involving many individual 
researchers, indeed sometimes hundreds of researchers, each 
producing sub-results within their own specialties that provide the 
individual pieces that in concert substantiate the target finding. He 
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illustrates this by cases drawn from experimental physics and 
mathematics, but something similar is no doubt true of research in 
many areas. This combination of collaboration and specialisation has, 
Hardwig suggests, a crucial epistemic implication: members of the 
collaborating group often have no choice but to trust the scientific 
competence and integrity of their associates for the accuracy of their 
results, and the honesty of their reports. This, I will assume, is the 
role of epistemic trust. 
 These examples and others like them concern what might be 
called specialised collaborative epistemic projects. But this I roughly 
mean projects that aim to establish the truth (or falsity) of a set of 
target propositions by means of collecting a large set of data and 
performing a number of inferences, where data collection and 
inferences is partitioned between several of individuals, each of 
whom is a specialist in his or her own particular field, but not in all 
fields involved in the project. Accordingly, in specialised 
collaborative projects each part of the story might be known by 
someone, an yet there may be no single individual who knows every 
part of the story. When this is so, the obvious epistemological 
question we can ask is this: Does anyone know the truth of the target 
propositions (assuming that they are true)? And if the target 
proposition is known, then by whom is it known, and how?  
 As indicated, Hardwig's basic proposal is this. In specialised 
collaborative epistemic projects, epistemic trust might (with other 
conditions) be sufficient for the individual members to know or be 
justified in believing the conclusions of such projects. And while 
there may be other conditions that would also be sufficient, 
epistemic trust is often the only relation that will actually be in place. 
Thus, epistemic trust is often what actually enables members of 
specialised collaborative epistemic projects to know or justifiably 
believe the conclusions of these projects.  
2.1	  A	  puzzling	  first	  account	  
To arrive at a more detailed account of the functional role of 
epistemic trust, consider first this somewhat schematic way of 
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characterising the epistemic properties of specialised collaborative 
epistemic projects. Suppose we have a socio-epistemic structure S 
consisting of the following 
  
Premises P1-Pn, a conclusion C, evidential relations between 
premises and the conclusion C, evidence for each premise E1 - 
En, a group of agents A1-An, Ac,  
  
for which the following holds: 
  
(1) For each premise Pi, exactly one agent Ai knows (or 
justifiably believes) the premise by first hand possession of the 
relevant evidence Ei 
  
(2) Exactly one agent Ac understands the evidential 
relationship between P1-Pn and C, so only this agent knows (or 
justifiably believes) that the evidential relationship between 
P1-Pn and the conclusion holds.  
  
(3) All agents knows (or justifiably believe) that (1) and (2) is 
true of S. 
 
Are (1), (2) and (3) compatible with any agent in S knowing the 
conclusion C? One might wonder how agents could know C. After 
all, every agent seems to lack knowledge or evidence crucial for 
inferring C? As I said, the Harwigian response I am interested in 
points to some form of social trust. In general, agents can know or 
justifiably believe conclusions of specialised collaborative epistemic 
projects partly in virtue of trusting that the other members of the 
collaborative project have indeed succeeded in doing their parts.  
 However, before elaborating this, I briefly want to comment 
on what turns out to be an entirely different suggestion also aired by 
Hardwig. Hardwig invites us to consider (and accept) the following 
principle (Hardwig 1991, 697):  
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(T) If A has good reason to believe that B has good reasons to 
believe p, then A has good reasons to believe p.  
 
and the similar principle for knowledge:  
 
(T') If A knows that B knows p, then A knows p. 
  
Presumably, Hardwig's point is that if we grant these principles, we 
can explain how agents in a socio-epistemic structure like S may 
know or be epistemically justified in believing C, despite not initially 
knowing or being epistemically justified in accepting the epistemic 
foundation of C. This is so, of course, in virtue of (3) above, in 
conjunction with (T) and (T'). When these assumptions are combined 
with assumption (3), then we get, roughly, that what any agent in S 
knows, all agents in S knows. And we get that what any agent in S 
has good reason to believe, every agent has good reason to believe. 
So, (T) and (T') would explain how agents in S know or justifiably 
believe C. 
 Interestingly, Hardwig seems to think that there is a 
distinctive 'blindness' to the knowledge that each agent might 
acquire in this way. The reasons necessary for the agent’s knowledge 
may include reasons that the agent does not have, but only knows or 
justifiably believes that other agents have (Hardwig 1991, 699). Yet, 
despite this blindness, they know, or so Hardwig suggests. 
 Indeed, it might be worries about this very blindness that 
leads Hardwig to think that (T) and (T') are controversial and 
therefore in need of justification. At any rate, Hardwig seems 
concerned about why we would want to accept (T) or (T'), and he 
proposes an argument in in favour of them. The argument Hardwig 
proposes has the form of a dilemma. Either we accept (T) and (T’), 
and the ensuing blindness of knowledge. Or, and this is the other 
horn of the dilemma, we face the following trilemma (Hardwig 1991, 
699): 
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(i) Skepticism. There can be no knowledge or justified belief in 
scientific disciplines in which there is 'too much available 
evidence'. 
  
(ii) Irrelevance of evidence. We can have knowledge while 
being of ignorant of evidence: 'one can know p only by 
ignoring most of the best evidence', or at least despite 
ignoring the best evidence. 
  
(iii) Epistemic collectivism. Knowledge and justified belief can 
pertain to collectives, rather than to individuals. 
  
Hardwig rejects the first two options in this trilemma as implausible, 
and assumes for the sake of further investigation that we ignore (iii). 
But then we seem forced to accept (T) and (T'). Now, there are some 
issues of interpretation regarding the details of the argument, and 
the way that Hardwig sets out the trilemma. But for the purpose of 
the discussion below I want to set these questions aside. The main 
point that Hardwig seems intent to make is that we need to accept 
(T) and (T') on pain of being unable to explain how one might know 
or have justified beliefs in the conclusions of collaborative epistemic 
projects.  
 Actually, what Hardwig says in defence of (T) and (T') is 
puzzling for at least two reasons. First, note that if we accept. 
  
Factivity. S knows that p ⇒ p 
 
and  
  
Closure. S knows that p & S knows that (p ⇒ q) ⇒ S knows 
that q 
  
then (ignoring a range of qualifications that hopefully don't matter 
here) it follows that 
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(T') If A knows that B knows that p, then A knows that p. 
 
So, (T') as stated may not be controversial at all, since it is a trivial 
implication of principles that are widely accepted. This would 
provide a defence of (T') that is much more persuasive than the sort 
of reductio that Hardwig offers. Whether (T) is controversial very 
much depends on the details of what is meant by 'good reasons', but 
it seems quite tempting to think that many plausible views of 
justification will support principles such as (T). So, contrary to what 
Hardwig seems to imply, (T) and (T') may not be controversial, and 
need not be defended by the sort of reduction that Hardwig presses. 
 The second and perhaps more puzzling feature of this part of 
Hardwig's paper is that it is not obvious what all of this has to do 
with epistemic trust. A's having reason to believe that B has a good 
reason to believe that p, or A's knowing that B has good reason to 
believe that p, does not invite to saying that A trusts B on this matter. 
Thus, if (T) and (T') are the principles by which structures such as S 
are held together, then one might reasonably say that they are linked 
by chains of justified belief, or chains of knowledge, rather than by 
trust. It is by no means obvious that what enables members of S to 
know the conclusion S has anything to do with what we might 
reasonably call epistemic trust.1 
                                                
1  The impression that trust has dropped out of the picture is 
also conveyed by Hardwig's own summary of the transmission of 
knowledge in social systems (Hardwig 1991, 699):  
 
(1) A knows that B says that p.  
(2) A believes (and has good reasons to believe?) that B is 
speaking truthfully, i.e., that B is saying what she believes.  
(3) A believes (and has good reasons to believe?) that B (unlike 
A) is in a position, first, to know what would be good reasons 
to believe p and, second, to have the needed reasons.  
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2.2	  Trust	  without	  evidence	  
I want to suggest that the more interesting question we should 
consider is the following. Unlike what we stipulated above, in 
specialised collaborative epistemic projects such as those common in 
science, members of these projects will not be in a position to know 
or be justified in believing that other members really have good 
reasons or evidence for believing what they do about their part of the 
project. That is, (3) or its equivalents in the specification of S above 
will not be true. When this is so, principles (T) and (T’) do not apply. 
So, should we say that such projects do not enable their members to 
know or justifiably believe the conclusions of their projects?  
 Again, to make this question more transparent, consider a 
new schematic structure S', consisting of  
  
Premises P1-Pn, a conclusion C, evidential relations between 
premises and the conclusion C, evidence for each premise E1 - 
En, a group of agents A1-An, Ac,  
 
for which the following holds: 
  
(1) For each premise Pi, exactly one agent Ai knows or 
justifiably believes the premise by first hand possession of the 
relevant evidence Ei 
  
(2) Exactly one agent Ac understands the evidential 
relationship between P1-Pn and C, so only this agent knows or 
                                                                                                                       
(4) A believes (and has good reasons to believe?) that B 
actually has good reasons for believing p when she thinks she 
does. 
 
Again, no mention of trust or epistemic trust is made in these 
principles. Note also the curious fact that the antecedents in (2), (3), (4) 
do not correspond to (T), though the paranteses do (ignoring the 
question marks). 
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justifiably believes that the evidential relationship between P1-
Pn and the conclusion holds.  
  
(3') No agent has sufficient evidence for knowing or justifiably 
believing that (1) and (2) holds of S’, though they do not have 
evidence suggesting that (1) and (2) are false.2 
 
Clearly, (T) and (T') do not apply to S', and this is because (3') states 
that no agent in S' is justified in believing (1) and (2), or knows that 
these hold of S'. That is, for all the agents know or justifiably believe, 
there might be some other members of the collective epistemic 
project who are not in possession of the appropriate first hand 
evidence, or do not justifiably believe or know the premises that they 
were supposed to be in charge of.  
 I actually think that this is the kind of socio-epistemic system 
that Hardwig really meant to discuss. At least, this interpretation 
makes sense of Hardwig's elaborate discussion of two further key 
questions. First, is science often like S'? And second, are agents in 
systems like S' in a position to know the conclusion C? Clearly, 
Hardwig defends an affirmative answer to both questions.3  
                                                
2  For consistency reasons, we can make an exception for Ac, 
such that (3') reads: with the exception of Ac, no other agent knows or 
justifiably believe that Ac is justified in believing that the proper 
evidential relationship between P1-Pn and the conclusion C actually 
holds. 
3  Hardwig defends an affirmative answer to the first question 
roughly as follows. Say that an agent A is trustworthy with respect to 
some domain of facts D just in case the agent (on request) reports her 
beliefs regarding D in a truthful, competent, and conscientious 
manner (Hardwig 1991, 700). Generally speaking, then, if an agent A 
is trustworthy, then if A reports that p, A is justified in her belief that 
p, or knows that p. In science, could one know or have first hand 
justified beliefs that some other researcher in some entirely different 
speciality than one's own, is trustworthy? Often the answer is 'No' 
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 Here I want to restrict myself to the second question just cited. 
How, if at all, can any member of S' know the conclusion C? Here is 
how Hardwig sums up what appears to be the bottom line:  
  
'a scientific community has no alternative to trust, including 
trust in the character of its members.' (Hardwig 1991, 706). 
  
Or here in a more elaborate form: 
 
'A must TRUST B, or A will not believe that B's testimony 
gives her good reasons to believe p. And B must be 
trustworthy or B's testimony will not in fact give A good 
reasons to believe p, regardless of what she might believe 
about B. A team of scientific experimentalists, for example, 
must both trust each other and be worthy of that trust or their 
experiment will not give anyone enough good reason to 
believe their conclusions. ' (Hardwig 1991, 700) 
  
                                                                                                                       
(Hardwig 1991, 701-2). Hardwig considers and rejects some reasons 
that might suggest otherwise. Does game-theoretic reasons show that 
individual researchers have prudential reasons to become and 
remain trustworthy? Often the answer is 'No'. Defection from 
cooperation may be detected too rarely, and there are too few 
interactions (Hardwig 1991, 702 ff.). Are there deterrents or 
safeguards in the regulation of science that would effectively detect 
or prevent fraudulent characters, thus grounding an assumption that 
scientists are generally trustworthy? It seems not (Hardwig 1991, 
703-5). So, the conclusion is that scientific communities (or sets of 
such communities) might often be social systems like S'. Although 
researchers may believe that other researchers are trustworthy, they 
often do not have first hand justification for such beliefs, and they do 
not know that others are truthsworthy. At best, this is just something 
they merely believe, or hope. 
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I suggest that the basic idea proposed here might be captured 
roughly in the following way: 
   
Trustworthiness. An agent A is trustworthy with respect to 
some domain of facts D just in case A is (i) competent with 
respect to questions within this domain, i.e. the agent can 
decide questions within this domain with a rather high 
reliability, and (ii) sincere, i.e on request or when otherwise 
relevant for the audience, A honestly reports her beliefs 
regarding the truth of propositions in D. 
 
In general, then, when people are trustworthy with respect to a 
particular domain, they are likely to have true beliefs about 
questions in that domain, and they will be honest and forthcoming in 
their reports about the content of these beliefs. I do not suggest, of 
course, that this definition of trustworthiness is precise, but it is 
precise enough for the discussion here. I want to propose that the 
basic Hardwigian suggestion is that what provides the epistemic 
glue of systems like S’ is not principles like (T) or (T’), but rather a 
principle like the following:  
 
(T*) If A knows that B reports that p, where p is in domain D, 
and A trusts B with respect to domain D, and B is in fact 
trustworthy regarding domain D, and A thereby adopts the 
belief that p, then A knows that p, or is epistemically justified 
in her belief that p.  
 
There are, of course, many further questions that one might press 
regarding (T*), including what the epistemic status of B's belief in p 
must be for A to get to know or be epistemically justified in believing 
that p. I want to set aside these questions here. Our interest in (T*) is 
due to the fact that this principle identifies a role for trust in the 
interpersonal transmission (or generation) of knowledge and 
justification. Even if A does not know and does not justifiably believe 
that B is trustworthy with respect to D, then A may trust that this is 
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so. And, according to (T*), when B is trustworthy, A's trust that this 
is so might be enough for A's resulting beliefs to earn a significant 
epistemic status. 
3. A Process Reliabilist Underpinning of Epistemic Trust 
Return now to our main question: What is the nature of epistemic 
trust? We can now try to avoid the essentialist caveat noted earlier by 
asking this question as follows: What is the nature of the relation that 
might suit the role designated by ‘A trusts B’ in (T*), such that (T*) 
comes out as a plausible epistemic principle, explaining how 
members of S' can know or be epistemically justified in the 
conclusion C?  
 It is worth here recalling two suggestions. First, one might 
think that A trusts B just in case A knows or justifiably believes that 
B is trustworthy with respect to a particular domain. While surely 
not unreasonable in its own right, the problem in this context is that 
on doxastic notions of trust, the configuration of S' and (T*) would 
imply that members of S' do not know the conclusion C, or are not 
epistemically justified in this conclusion, since we have assumed that 
in such systems agents do not know, and are not justified in 
believing, that other agents are trustworthy within their specialised 
domains.4 
 Alternatively, one might think of trust as a particular emotion 
or a feeling of confidence about someone or something, which would 
likely be a non-doxastic psychological state. Again, considered in its 
                                                
4  As a reviewer pointed out, one could imagine other doxastic 
accounts of epistemic trust. One might say, for example, that A trusts 
B just in case A believes that B is trustworthy, though A's belief need 
have no special pedigree, and therefore no special epistemic status. 
As I have stipulated S', nothing rules out that agents could trust each 
other in this slim sense. The challenge for this form trust is how it 
would explain that it can ground knowledge (assuming that we want 
our account of trust to explain this). Presumably, more conditions 
would need to be added.  
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own right, this idea does not seem implausible. But for such a notion 
of trust to fit into (T*) much more would have to be said. 
 For these reasons I want to explore the possibility that we 
think of trust along the following lines:  
 
A trusts B regarding a domain D just in case A has a non-
doxastic disposition to accept as true (or give high credence 
to) the content of B's statements within domain D. 
 
A non-doxastic disposition is here a disposition that is not itself 
based on a belief that someone is trustworthy. So, on this view, 
epistemic trust is neither a form of belief, and not is it a non-doxastic 
attitude akin to hopes, emotions or desires.  
 Let me hasten to point out that the notion of trust just given 
will not alone render (T*) plausible. This is for the following reason. 
Suppose that A trusts B who is in fact trustworthy, but A's trust in B 
is quite indiscriminate - A would trust just about anyone, and it was 
mere luck that made A trust someone who is in fact trustworthy. Or 
suppose that A trusts B, but that A ignores evidence suggesting that 
B is not trustworthy at all in the relevant domain. In both types of 
cases we would, I submit, be disinclined to accept that A's resulting 
beliefs would be justified, or count as known if true. So, the proposed 
notion of trust does not meet the requirement of rendering (T*) 
plausible, and this is because a condition on discrimination in the 
selection of trusted sources, and a condition on sensitivity to 
defeaters is not met. One might consider building these conditions 
into a somewhat artificial notion of trust, which, when appended to 
(T*) would have this principle come out plausible. But rather than 
doing that, it seems more transparent and natural simply to revise 
(T*) to get the following:5 
 
                                                
5  Thanks to Mikkel Gerken for suggesting that this is a more 
natural strategy. 
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(T**) If A knows that B reports that p, where p is in domain D, 
and A trusts B with respect to domain D, and (i) B is in fact 
trustworthy regarding domain D, and (ii) A's trust in B is 
discriminating and defeater-sensitive, and (iii) A thereby 
adopts the belief that p, then A knows that p, or is 
epistemically justified in her belief that p.  
 
A disposition to accept as true is discriminating just when it tends to 
be pick out trustworthy sources. A trusting agent has the property of 
defeater-sensitivity when she remains sensitive to cues or evidence 
that the information source is not trustworthy, perhaps despite her 
initial trust in the source. 
 Let me add some remarks about this characterisation of 
epistemic trust. It might be tempting to think of trust as a distinct 
type of psychological attitude or emotion that one might take to 
other individuals. However, my being inclined to accept what you 
say as true regarding some matter is not the same as entertaining any 
particular psychological attitude to you. But epistemic trust thus 
conceived may be an emotionally based disposition, by which I mean 
that it may be in part caused or upheld by an emotional attitude. I 
may epistemically trust someone where this trust is causally 
dependent on my liking this person, or my feeling confident about 
the person. I may epistemically trust someone because I am in the 
habit of doing so, or because doing so is an inseparable part of a 
membership of a cultural group, or indeed a research tradition. So, 
epistemic trust may be causally related to psychological or 
sociological mechanisms not traditionally counted as a part of 
epistemology.  
 As mentioned, (T**) contains a condition regarding 
discrimination. This is motivated by the fact that acquiring 
knowledge by trusting a source of information is not compatible 
with trusting everything or everyone, even if one by chance stumbles 
upon a trustworthy source. So, for true beliefs acquired by trust in 
sources to acquire the status as knowledge, these sources need to be 
selected in certain discriminating ways. So, knowledge based on 
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trust not only requires that one's trusted source is in fact reliable, but 
also that the mechanism by which one has selected a particular 
source is non-arbitrary in certain ways. But the mechanisms that 
facilitates the discrimination need not, on the view I am proposing, 
be internal to the trusting subject, and he or she need not even know 
about their existence, or justifiably believe that they operate. A 
trusting subject may be embedded in a social system that brings 
about the discrimination necessary, and I suspect that this is often 
how we manage acquire sufficiently discriminatory power. 
 Knowledge or justification acquired by epistemic trust also 
requires sensitivity to defeaters. Someone placing epistemic trust in 
some source of evidence must remain sensitive to cues or evidence 
that the source is not trustworthy after all. An agent might for 
example acquire evidence suggesting that a source is in general not 
reliable (general undermining defeater), or that an otherwise 
trustworthy subject has made a mistake on a particular occasion 
(specific undermining defeater), or against the proposition asserted 
by the trusted person (specific overriding defeaters). I do not want to 
suggest that any defeating evidence, however weak or remotely 
plausible, can undermine conditions under which we can acquire 
knowledge or justification by epistemic trust in a source. The 
requirement of sensitivity that I have in mind is only the unspecific 
one that when presented with strong enough defeaters, the trusting 
subject should not accept the belief or information relayed to her. 
 Finally, one may wonder why condition (i) and (ii) are both 
necessary.6 The thought would be that (ii) makes (i) redundant. If A's 
trust in B is genuinely discriminating and defeater-sensitive, then B 
has to be trustworthy, so we do not need to add (i) as a seperate 
requirement. However, Suppose that some agent B is not 
trustworthy (meaning either that B is not competent, or that B is not 
inclined to transmit what B takes to be true). Some agent A can be 
sensitive to defeaters, and in possession of a (general) capacity to 
discriminate trustworthiness, and yet A trusts B (since no defeaters 
                                                
6  Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for rasing this worry. 
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to B's trustworthiness are around, and because A's capacity to 
discriminate trustworthiness is not infallible. So, A has mistakenly 
identified B as trustworthy. In this case, even if A happens to get a 
true belief from B, this is not knowledge. It's Gettierized knowledge, 
if you will. So, condition (i) is needed. 
 Of course, I don't claim that whenever we trust some source, 
we do so in way that is discriminate and defeater-sensitive. If 
someone is disposed to accept as true what various sources says, but 
his trust does not meet the requirement of discrimination, we can 
refer to this as indiscriminate trust. True belief acquired by 
indiscriminate trust does not amount to knowledge. Similarly, if 
someone trusts some source of information, and yet remain 
insensitive to information defeating the trusthworthiness of the 
source, then we have a case of what we might call defeater-insensitive 
trust. Again, defeater-insensitive trust cannot ground knowledge. 
Both are forms of gullibility, and both might be considered marks of 
epistemic irrationality.7 
3.1	  Trust	  based	  super-­‐credence	  
It is crucial to consider whether we ever believe much on epistemic 
trust as I have stipulated this notion. As we have seen, Hardwig 
seems to think that we do, indeed he insists that the vast majority of 
what we regard as scientific knowledge depend on trust, and as I 
discussed above, arguably what he had in mind was something like 
epistemic trust in the stipulated sense.  
 In part, Hardwig's argument for the central role of trust 
depend on a negative assessment of the possibility that members of 
the scientific community could know or be justified in believing that 
collaborating partners in the scientific community are indeed 
trustworthy in the sense presupposed in such collaborative epistemic 
projects. However, it has been suggested that Hardwig is too 
pessimistic here, underestimating the extent to which members of 
various scientific specialties might have good evidence for the 
                                                
7  See the related discussion in (Goldberg 2010) 
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trustworthiness of other parts of science, see (Adler 1994; Goldman 
2001). 
 Another challenge comes from the view that there are general 
but defeasible reasons to expect that others are trustworthy in the 
domains that they speak out about: when someone asserts 
something, then one has a prima facie reason to believe the truth of 
what has been asserted. If this is right then while we might well 
epistemically trust others, the crucial epistemic work could be due 
these sorts of prima facie reasons to expect that that others are 
trustworthy (Burge 1993; Foley 2001).  
 Yet at third question concerns whether we could reasonably 
attribute epistemic trust to an agent without attributing the 
corresponding beliefs about trustworthiness. The idea is this: if we 
think that A is disposed to accept as true what B reports in a 
particular domain, then it would be quite natural also to attribute to 
A the belief that B is trustworthy in this domain. But now it may 
begin to look as if, when we have good reasons to say that A 
epistemically trusts B, we also have good reasons to think that A 
believes with at least some confidence that B is trustworthy. But it 
may be hard to attribute such a belief to A, unless we also think that 
A has at least some evidence for the trustworthiness of B. But now it 
seems that what does the epistemic work need not be A's epistemic 
trust in B as such, but A's associated beliefs and evidence regarding 
the trustworthiness of B.  
 For such reasons, one might worry about the idea that we 
often accept beliefs on grounds of epistemic trust, and we might even 
doubt whether this is a coherent possibility. At least it should be 
stressed that this is not nearly as obvious at might seem at first 
impression. When relations of epistemic trust are in place, many 
other epistemically relevant factors may also be operative. 
 Nonetheless epistemic trust remains an interesting topic for 
epistemology, or so I want to maintain. To focus our discussion, we 
can consider cases in which someone is more confident in her belief 
than is warranted by the evidence that she has for the truth of the 
belief, and where this higher level of confidence is due to his 
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epistemic trust in some source of information. More specifically, we 
can consider what I will label trust-based super-credence. Cases of 
trust-based super-credence are instances of the following schema:  
 
(i) A believes that p with credence n  
 
(ii) A's own evidence for p warrants credence m 
 
(iii) n > m 
 
(iv) A's super-credence is due to A's epistemic trust in source I 
(where I is a source informing A that p). 
 
Here are some cases that illustrate ways in which trust-based super-
credence might come about. My friend Paul tells me that p. When I 
consult my evidence, it turns out that I only have some rather weak 
evidence that Paul is trustworthy in this domain, deriving from my 
previous dealings with Paul, and from my general assumptions 
about Paul's epistemic competence in the domain in question. 
However, I also have some evidence (again, rather weak evidence) 
suggesting that p is false. Nonetheless, because I epistemically trust 
Paul in these matters, I believe that p with higher credence than my 
own evidence warrants.  
 Another case is this. My friend Peter tells me that p. Though 
evidence about the trustworthiness of Peter is available to me, I don't 
consider it and I don't process it. I do not even consider whether such 
evidence is available - I neither believe that it is available or believe 
that it is not. I just epistemically trust Peter on the matter, and thus 
believe that p with a higher credence than is warranted by the 
evidence that I in fact consider.  
 Here is a third case. My friend Oscar tells me that p. I am 
aware of some evidence for p, and of some evidence for the 
trustworthiness of Oscar in these matters. However, I do not try to 
determine the exact degree to which these sources of evidence 
support p. Instead, because I have considerable epistemic trust in 
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Oscar on these matters, I place a higher credence in the truth of p 
than is actually warranted by my reflection on the evidence. 
 Cases of trust-based super-credence might be rare, though I 
am inclined to think they are not. However that may be, for the 
reasons I have provided, they seem possible. What is much more 
debatable, of course, is whether they are signs of epistemic 
irrationality. Or more specifically, one might suspect that putative 
cases of trust-based super-credence face a dilemma. Either these 
cases are incompletely described - there is bound to be some hidden 
evidence in these cases, evidence that rationalize the level of 
credence adopted by the trusting agent. Or else they are cases of 
epistemic irrationality. The first horn of this dilemma asserts that one 
cannot really have higher credence in a belief than one's evidence 
warrants - real cases of this sort inevitably contain additional strains 
of evidence concerning the trustworthiness of the source in question. 
The second horn of the dilemma admits that this need not be so, but 
charges that we then face a case of epistemic irrationality.  
3.2	  A	  process	  reliabilist	  account	  of	  epistemic	  trust	  
I want to adapt a well-known albeit philosophically controversial 
reply to this problem. We can make sense of the suggested notion of 
epistemic trust on the wider background of process reliabilism  
regarding justification (Goldman 1979; Goldman 1986). Essentially, 
this move evades the above dilemma by simply denying that 
justified belief or knowledge needs to be based on evidence (in the 
sense of evidence necessary for the above dilemma to arise). So, 
according to process reliabilism, there is nothing problematic about 
according a belief high credence when doing so is due to a reliable 
belief-forming proces, and there are no defeaters in the vicinity. I will 
not defend process reliabilism or related views; there are all sorts of 
well-know worries about process reliabilism. My much more modest 
aim is merely to elaborate the idea that epistemic trust can be 
considered an ingredient in belief forming process that may yield 
knowledge in much the same way that memory or perception do, 
according to the process reliabilist. Also, note that I do not want to 
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claim that process reliabilism uniquely supports a notion of 
epistemic trust - other externalist views may well do so for reasons 
parallel to the ones depicted below.8 
  On the view I propose, acquiring a belief by epistemic trust in 
a trustworthy source may yield doxastic justification, or knowledge 
if the belief is true, and the level of doxastic justification high 
enough. What makes a belief acquired by trust known or justified is 
the nature of the trusting disposition in conjunction with the 
trustworthiness of the trusted source, and the conditions on 
discrimination and defeater-sensitivity. According to the process 
reliabilist picture I adopt, the explanation of this is due to the internal 
relation between between epistemic trust in trustworthy sources and 
reliable belief-forming processes. Very roughly, when a subject 
acquires a belief by epistemic trust in a trustworthy source, this 
implies the existence of a reliable belief-forming process by which 
the belief is acquired or sustained. And when the conditions on 
discrimination and defeater-sensitivity are met, the reliable process 
in question has been selected in discriminating ways, and the 
trusting subject is sensitive to defeaters to the reliability of that 
process. This is the process reliabilist explanation of why epistemic 
trust can generate knowledge and justified belief. 
 On the view emerging, epistemic trust in external sources of 
information is analogous to the way that we trust our senses, our 
memory and various inferential skills. According to a rough process 
reliabilist account, these are all ingrained belief-forming processes 
that may ground knowledge and doxastic justification in so far as 
they work reliably, and provided that the processes meet the 
conditions of discrimination and sensitivity. The condition regarding 
defeater-sensitivity is normally met, as we are usually sensitive to 
defeating evidence regarding the reliability of our modes of sense 
perception, memory and inferential skills. We can imagine a scenario 
in which a being uses these native reliable modes of belief formation, 
                                                
8  This parallels the strategy in (Goldberg 2010), to which my 
exposition here owes a lot. 
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but where the subject nonetheless ignores cues suggesting that the 
mode is unreliable. Where the evidence of unreliability is strong 
enough, this is incompatible with knowledge, as well as with 
doxastic justification. 
 We can imagine a being that fails to be discriminate regarding 
her use of native cognitive resources. Imagine a cognitive being 
endowed with several native or acquired cognitive resources, say 
several modes of sense perception, or patterns of reasoning. Suppose 
that for some reason only half of these processes are reliable, given 
the tasks they are applied to. Suppose now that the cognitive being 
has the capacity to trust any mode of belief formation, but that this 
trust is indiscriminate. So, for a given cognitive task, the being 
happens to trust certain modes of belief formation, but the selection 
of modes is completely indiscriminate between reliable and 
unreliable sources. Now, intuitively, a belief formed in this way 
would not count as epistemically justified, or as known if true. This 
is because the condition on discrimination is not met. Fortunately, 
we are not cognitive beings like that. Evolution, reflection and 
acquired skills usually make us highly discriminate in the selection 
of the cognitive sources we trust for a given task. 
 In many of the cases we have considered, epistemic trust is 
directed at individuals, groups of individuals, institutions, or even 
traditions. In these cases, knowledge or justification acquired by 
epistemic trust depend on social processes or social factors, because 
the entire belief forming process is partly social, or, more generally, 
non-individualist. And the properties of discrimination and defeater-
sensitivity, in turn, need not depend only or even predominantly on 
the trusting individual. These properties can be instantiated in virtue 
of the social system that the subject is part of. So, an individual may 
be discriminate and defeater-sensitive in her trust due to social 
factors.  
 It seems apt to say that when epistemic trust is not based on 
evidence or reasons, it is blind. One might even suggest that genuine 
epistemic trust is necessarily at least partially blind. As Hardwig 
says: 'After all, trust, in order to be trust, must be a least partially 
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blind' (Hardwig 1991, 693). Epistemic trust, as I have laid out the 
notion, can be both discriminating and defeater-sensitive. When this 
is so, epistemic trust might still be blind, though fortunately not 
without a sense of orientation. In a recent paper Dan Sperber and 
others highlight the socio-epistemic importance of what they call 
epistemic vigilance (Sperber, Clément et al. 2010). Epistemic 
vigilance is the alertness to cues of lack of trustworthiness of others, 
or lack of plausibility of the claims they make. When meeting the 
conditions on discrimination and defeater-sensitivity, epistemic trust 
involves epistemic vigilance. As Sperber et al says: epistemic 
vigilance is the opposite not of trust, but of blind trust (Sperber, 
Clément et al. 2010, 363). What they mean by blind trust is exactly 
what I call indiscriminate and defeater-insensitive trust.  
3.3	  The	  problem	  of	  extended	  reliability	  
On the proposed account, epistemic trust involves a dispositional 
property to accept information delivered by particular sources. This 
dispositional property itself is a property of an individual, and not a 
property of the individual's social system or environment. 
 But have suggested two ways in which knowledge and 
justification acquired by epistemic trust may, and typically do, 
depend on factors that go beyond the individual, factors that a non-
individualist in the sense of (Goldberg 2010). First, for epistemic trust 
to generate a known belief, one must trust a trustworthy source. In 
other words, there need to be a reliable process of information 
aquisition extending beyond the cognitive system of the trusting 
agent. Second, the properties of discrimination and defeater-
sensitivity need not themselves be grounded in properties of the 
subject. Instead, they can be features of the social system that the 
agent is a part of. 
 As (Goldberg 2010) discusses, there is a particular way in 
which this dependence on non-individualist factors is controversial 
even among process reliabilists. Suppose that A trusts source I 
regarding the information that p (where I may be another individual, 
an organisation, a tradition and so on). So, A believes that p on the 
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ground that the source I says so, and because A trusts I on these 
matters. Suppose further, that A is discriminate and defeater-
sensitive with regards to sources like I, and that p is indeed true. No 
evidence is available to A that would suggest that I is not reliable or 
trustworthy. However, as it happens I is not reliable, and it is mere 
chance and good luck that, on this occasion, A receives the 
information that p, rather than the information that not-p.  
 It seems clear that when this element of epistemic luck is 
brought out in the open, we don't want to say that A knows that p, 
although S's belief that p is true, and acquired in what to A seems to 
be a respectable way. But is A epistemically justified in her belief that 
p, and is the case consequently a Gettier Case? Or should we rather 
say that A is not even epistemically justified in her belief, since the 
relevant process by which the belief was formed is not reliable? If we 
chose the latter, the implication is that doxastic justification depends 
on social factors in a way that has not previously been 
acknowledged. 
 Goldberg argues that process reliabilists are in fact committed 
to accepting what he labels 'the extendedness hypothesis' (Goldberg 
2010, 79ff). According to this hypothesis, the properties in virtue of 
which a subject's belief is epistemically justified may be non-
individualist; they may involve properties of a subject's environment 
or the social system in which the subject is embedded because the 
process by which information is relayed to the subject extends 
spheres. If we accept the extendedness hypothesis, we should say 
that the subject lacks epistemic justification in the case above.  
 I am sympathetic to the extendedness hypothesis, though a 
full discussion of the issue is beyond the scope of this paper. Here I 
just want to note that whether one accepts the extendedness 
hypothesis or not, as a process reliabilist one should agree that true 
beliefs acquired by epistemic trust in trustworthy sources may 
indeed qualify as known and epistemically justified. Epistemic trust 
should therefore be welcomed in the process reliabilist's inventory of 
respectable belief forming practices. The above dispute, interesting 
as it is, concerns the more specific question of how to categorize 
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cases like the above, not whether epistemic trust is an acceptable 
mode of belief formation.9 
4. Trust, Evidence and Reasons 
I now want to relate the proposed view on epistemic trust to certain 
other views about trust and the epistemic role of trust.10 What I have 
proposed is, in a sense, a non-evidentialist conception of epistemic 
trust. Having epistemic trust in a source of information does not 
amount to having evidence that the trusted source is trustworthy, 
and neither does trusting require having such evidence.  
 Clearly, there are other uses of 'trust'. One can trust the truth 
of propositions, say when trusting that the bridge will bear when 
crossing. I can trust Adam to do something in part because I believe 
that Adam knows that I depend on him doing it. One can trust very 
basic propositions in the absence of evidence for them, say the 
proposition that there is an external world. One can trust the 
reliability of very basic ways of forming belief or the truth or validity 
of basic epistemic principles. These forms of trust take different 
objects (propositions, individuals, methods, principles). I would be 
inclined to think that they involve a variety of different psychological 
                                                
9  In a comment to Hardwig's papers, Goldman remarks that 
Hardwig's notion of blind trust would seem to have skeptical 
implications, since trusting blindly is incompatible with rational 
justification (Goldman 2001, 86). However, this remark did not seem 
to concern the sort of process reliabilist take on epistemic trust 
proposed here. Of course, Goldman might object to Goldberg's claim 
that process reliabilists are committed to accepting the extendedness 
hypothesis. But even so, he should welcome epistemic trust as laid 
out here, even with the sort of blindness and social dependency that 
pertains to it. This view as such does not commit to the extendedness 
hypothesis. 
10  One should bear in mind that we should probably not view 
these theories as competing theories concerning the same subject 
matter, but rather as attempts to conceptualise slightly different 
phenomena 
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states and relations. It seems reasonably to think that these uses of 
'trust' bears some family resemblance, but I am skeptical about the 
idea of there being one unified phenomenon of trust which is 
instantiated in these different cases. But not much depends on this. I 
have tried to detail a specific notion of trust by specifying a 
functional role. Whether the form of trust thus identified bears a 
relation of family resemblance to what is expressed by other uses of 
'trust', or whether there is some more unified account to be given, is 
a separate question that we need not address for the purpose of the 
current paper.  
 Some uses of 'trust' relates directly or indirectly to evidence. 
Elisabeth Fricker, for example, relates trust to rational deference and 
evidence. On her view it is rational to accept some belief on the 'basis 
of trust in another's testimony' only if one has, roughly, evidence for 
the competence and sincerity of the testifier, and 'one is not aware of 
significant contrary testimony regarding P' (Fricker 2006, 232). 
 Russell Hardin speaks about trusting others as equivalent to 
rationally expecting that they will honour their commitments. This 
just means that I can trust someone in the sense that I have good 
reasons for believing that the incentive structure affecting this 
individual is such that he will know or believe that it is in his rational 
self-interest to collaborate (Hardin 1996). So for Hardin, trust is very 
much like a doxastic attitude, the content of which we can have 
evidence for, and presumably trust is appropriate just when we have 
this evidence. 
 Somewhat in contrast to this, Paul Faulkner states that in 
'trusting a speaker we adopt a credulous attitude. This attitude is 
basic and cannot be reduced to the belief that a speaker is 
trustworthy or reliable' (Faulkner 2007, 305). Faulkner's theory of the 
epistemic role of trust is elaborate and deserves a more detailed 
discussion. Here I just want to note two things. First, like many 
others, Faulkner thinks of trust as a prediction related to very 
particular types of social situations essentially involving my reliance 
on others. My trust in you amounts to my prediction that you will 
act in a certain way in part because I know or believe that you have 
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realised that I depend on your acting in just that way, and I know or 
believe that this will motivate you. It is not obvious how this extends 
to trust in say institutions or traditions, and yet there is a sense in 
which we can be said to trust such items. Second, on Faulkner's 
account, trust concerns the sincerity of an agent, but not this agent's 
epistemic competences. Trusting that B is sincere involves expecting 
that, given the appropriate occasion, B will report to me anything 
that she regards as true and relevant for me, and nothing she regards 
as false or irrelevant, within a particular domain. Clearly, this need 
not involve anything about B's competencies in the domain. By 
contrast, the property of trustworthiness, as I defined it, involves 
both sincerity and competence. 
 In an influential paper on trust, Richard Holton asserts that 
'sometimes we can trust a friend to speak knowledgeably and 
sincerely, without believing that they will. As a result of this we will 
believe what they say.' (Holton 1994, 75). So, on this view, trusting is 
something we may resort to when we we don't believe, and don't 
have sufficient evidence for believing, the proposition that someone 
is trustworthy. So, trust is not a doxastic attitude, and does not 
require evidence. Holton writes: 'Trust, I will suggest, is a distinctive 
kind of attitude involving a distinctive state of mind.' (Holton 1994, 
63), and he has interesting things to say about what kind of non-
doxastic attitude trust is. By contrast, I suggest a notion of epistemic 
trust whereby trust involves a disposition to accept information, and 
this need not imply the existence of any particular type of 
psychological state. Trust in my sense may typically involve and 
causally depend emotional states like feelings of confidence, and so 
on, but need not. And epistemic trust in my sense does not consist of 
a psychological state. However, as mentioned earlier, there may be 
no deep disagreement here. Different views on trust might not 
advance competing theories of the same notion of trust, but simply 
specify different notions. 
 Holton also asserts that one can to some extent decide to trust 
(Holton 1994), and he offers some examples in support of this. Here 
might be an interesting conflict with a role of trust in epistemology. 
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Suppose I don't initially trust your views about some topic, which 
happens to be extremely important for me. Unfortunately, I am not 
in a position to get this information from anywhere else, so I cannot 
acquire the knowledge or doxastic justification I need. Can I solve 
this problem by simply deciding to trust you? Assuming that you are 
in fact trustworthy, but that I am not inclined to accept what you say, 
say in part because I have no evidence pertaining to you sincerity 
and competence. Can I nonetheless acquire knowledge or doxastic 
justification from by simply deciding to trust you? Intuitively, this 
does not seem right, so any account of trust suggesting that one 
might acquire knowledge or doxastic justification as a result of 
volitional trust would need to explain how this is possible. 
 My proposed account of epistemic trust does not support the 
idea that we can decide to trust. I cannot decide to have a disposition 
to believe what someone says, just as I cannot decide to believe a 
particular proposition. At most I can decide to accept what you say. I 
can, of course, decide to cultivate epistemic trust in you, or at least I 
could decide to try to cultivate a certain pattern of epistemic trust. 
Indeed, one might argue that an important part of our intellectual 
upbringing consists precisely in inculcating certain patterns of 
epistemic trust; through our education and training we acquire 
dispositions to trust certain sources of information, and not others. 
Similarly, by policing and design, we might try to create and 
maintain an environment such that the sources of information that 
we in fact tend to trust are just the trustworthy ones.  
4.1	  Trust	  and	  epistemic	  reasons	  
On the view I propose, my epistemic trust in a particular source of 
evidence is a disposition to accept as true what this source says. If we 
think of epistemic reasons as known or justifiably believed 
propositions in the light of which it is epistemically rational to accept 
certain other propositions, then epistemic trust is not an epistemic 
reason. Similarly, if we think of prototypes of evidence as perceptual 
states or perceived facts, then again epistemic trust is not evidence. 
So, while it might be perfectly legitimate to say that I believe that p in 
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part because I trust a given source, this should not be taken to imply 
that my epistemic trust in this source is an epistemic reason or 
evidence for my belief that p.  
 Just as epistemic trust does not provide epistemic reasons or 
evidence, epistemic trust does not need epistemic reasons or 
evidence. If one has epistemic reasons or evidence for the 
trustworthiness of a particular source of information, then there is a 
sense in which one ought to believe accordingly, and in consequence 
one ought to align one's confidence in this source. So, clearly, one can 
trust a source for reasons, and a form of trust might be a rationally 
required response to such reasons. 
 On the view I propose, epistemic trust is not evidence or 
epistemic reasons, and epistemic trust need not be sustained by 
evidence or reasons. This might invite a specific objection that I now 
turn to:  
 
Suppose that Adam tells me that p. As it happens I have some 
evidence E against p, though not terribly strong evidence. But 
since I trust Adam on this matter, I assume that the evidence 
against p must be misleading, and I end up believing that p 
with a high credence. So, my epistemic trust in Adam 
regarding p in a sense defeats or outweighs the evidence that I 
have against p, or at least it makes me discount that evidence.	  
 
How, one might ask, can a purely non-evidential conception of 
epistemic trust account for the fact (or the putative fact) that 
epistemic trust interacts with epistemic reasons or evidence in these 
ways? How can it be epistemically rational to discount my evidence 
against some proposition on the ground of epistemic trust, when 
epistemic trust is neither evidence, nor based on evidence (and is not 
even a doxastic state)?11  
                                                
11  An objection to certain views on testimony exploiting this was 
set forth by Jennifer Lackey, and is discussed in a draft by Paul 
Faulkner. Faulkner provides an interesting attempt to show 'how the 
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 I propose a simple explanation: it is not epistemic trust as such 
that interacts with evidence, but the resulting beliefs acquired by 
trust and held with a certain level of rational credence. Suppose that 
Adam is in fact trustworthy on the relevant matter, and that my trust 
is discriminate and sensitive. I then have a high rational credence in 
my belief that p. Given this, it may be rational for me to infer that E is 
misleading. So, my epistemic trust in Adam is part of what makes 
me rationally discount the misleading evidence E. But it is not that 
epistemic trust itself is a separate bit of evidence that serves as an 
undermining or overriding defeater of E. 
5. Concluding remarks 
I have argued is that if we accept process reliabilism, there is a 
respectable notion of epistemic trust that may sustain knowledge 
and justified belief. How much this matters in practice is an open 
question about which I have not said much. Still, this highlights a 
way in which some of our knowledge and justification may be 
socially dependent. Sometimes our knowledge and doxastic 
justification depends on factors that extend beyond our own 
cognitive system and into the wider socio-epistemic environment of 
which we are a part. This holds both for the trustworthiness of 
sources of information, but also for the properties of defeater-
sensitivity and discrimination, two properties that may in part reside 
in features of our wider socio-epistemic environment. In turn, this 
suggests an important meliorative aspect of social epistemology. We 
can improve the spread of knowledge and justification by designing 
and maintaining social systems that improve trustworthiness of the 
array of information-relaying sources, social systems that improve 
discriminative abilities (whether based on social or individual 
properties), and by improving sensitivity to defeaters (whether based 
on social or individual properties). 
                                                                                                                       
decision to trust can make good epistemic sense even if it is not 
based on the evidence' (Faulkner 2010, 5). Interesting as it is, I will 
not discuss the details of this here. My conception of epistemic trust 
is different from Faulkner's on a number of points. 
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